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Were experiments ever neglected? Ian Hacking 
and the history of philosophy of experiment1
Massimiliano Simons and Matteo Vagelli
Abstract: Ian Hacking’s Representing and Intervening is often credited as being one of 
the first works to focus on the role of experimentation in philosophy of science, catalyzing a 
movement which is sometimes called the “philosophy of experiment” or “new experimental-
ism”. In the 1980s, a number of other movements and scholars also began focusing on the 
role of experimentation and instruments in science. Philosophical study of experimentation 
has thus seemed to be an invention of the 1980s whose central figure is Hacking. This article 
aims to assess this historical claim, made by Hacking himself as well as others. It does so first 
by highlighting how a broader perspective on the history of philosophy reveals this invention 
narrative to be incorrect, since experimentation was a topic of interest for earlier philoso-
phers. Secondly, the article evaluates a revision of this historical claim also made by some phi-
losophers of experiment: the rediscovery narrative, which frames Hacking and others as hav-
ing rediscovered the work of these earlier authors. This second narratives faces problems as 
well. Therefore we develop a third narrative which we call the contextualist narrative. Rather 
than considering experimentation in an essentialist manner as a fixed research object that is 
either present or not in the work of specific authors, experimentation should be addressed 
through a narrative that asks in what way it becomes a philosophical problem for certain 
authors and for what purpose. Such contextualization enables a repositioning of Hacking’s 
philosophy of experiment in relation to the specific debates in which he intervened, such 
as the realism-antirealism debate, the Science Wars and the debate on incommensurability.
Keywords: Ian Hacking; philosophy of experiment; experimentalism; realism; con-
structivism; Science Wars
1. Introduction
Ian Hacking’s work is often credited as being one of the main inspirations 
of the “philosophy of experiment” (Hacking 1988a) or “new experimentalism” 
 1 The authors are named alphabetically, since the work on the paper was shared equally. Simons 
wrote pages 170-177 and Vagelli wrote pages 177-186. The authors want to thank the organisers and 
participants of two conferences where earlier versions of this paper were presented: “Open Episte-
mologies: Mach, Bachelard, Feyerabend (Lisbon, 20-21 September 2019)” and “Bachelardismes et anti-
bachelardismes en France: Controverses épistémologiques des années 1960 (Paris, 16-17 April 2019).
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(Ackermann 1989), a philosophical program that has put the role of experi-
ments in science on the philosophical agenda. That this movement has gained 
influence and status over the past 40 years is evident in the numerous books 
that have appeared on the topic (gooding and Pinch 1989; Mayo 1996; Rad-
der 2003) and the birth of related philosophical subtopics, such as exploratory 
experimentation (Steinle 2002; Burian 2007) or simulation (Lenhard 2007; 
Winsberg 2009).
Often Hacking’s Representing and Intervening (1983) is taken as the starting 
point for this movement. Allan Franklin, a pioneering representative of the 
new experimentalists, maintained that “Representing and Intervening has made 
it legitimate to discuss the philosophy of experiment” (Franklin 1986: x). More 
recently, Theodore Arabatzis has stated that “it was only recently, during the 
1980s, that experimental practice attracted the attention of philosophers of sci-
ence” and that “Ian Hacking’s work has been decisive in redressing the neglect 
of experiment and in bringing out its philosophical significance” (Arabatzis 
2008: 162).
This historical claim can be found in Hacking’s book itself. In the second 
part of Representing and Intervening, Hacking stresses that science not only 
represents the world but also intervenes in it. Hacking links this with the his-
torical claim that the topic of experimentation has been ignored in the phi-
losophy of science. “Philosophers of science constantly discuss theories and 
representation of reality, but say almost nothing about experiment, technology, 
or the use of knowledge to alter the world” (Hacking 1983: 149).
This historical claim also has been defended by other new experimentalists. 
For instance, in his The Neglect of Experiment, Franklin asks “Who was ne-
glecting experiment? Certainly not scientists. I believed then that it was histo-
rians, philosophers, and sociologists of science [….] Actual experiments were 
rarely discussed” (Franklin 1986: 1). Similarly, Robert Ackermann starts his 
analysis by saying that “[p]revious views have left the role of scientific experi-
mentation out of account” (Ackermann 1985: 30).
What is perhaps more noteworthy is that new experimentalists were not the 
first to make this historical claim about a gap in knowledge regarding experi-
mentation. The late 1970s marked the beginning of a period characterized by 
what is often called a “practical” or “practice turn” (Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina 
and von Savigny 2001, Soler et al. 2014, Agazzi and Heinzmann 2015), wit-
nessed by a sudden rise in interest in the experimental, technical, and material 
aspects of science.
Early influential examples of this turn in the sociology and history of sci-
ence include Andrew Pickering’s Constructing Quarks (1984), Steven Shapin’s 
and Simon Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985), and Harry Collins’ 
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Changing Order (1985). Pickering, for instance, aimed to introduce the agency 
of scientists into sociological accounts: “One gets little feeling that scientists 
actually do anything in their day-to-day practice” (Pickering 1984: 8). Similarly, 
Shapin and Schaffer opened their book with the statement that “[o]ur subject 
is experiment. We want to understand the nature and status of experimental 
practices and their intellectual products” (Shapin and Schaffer 1985: 3).
Around the same time, sociologists began performing ethnographic stud-
ies of laboratories, again stressing the role of experimentation and interven-
tion. The most famous example is Laboratory Life (1979) by Bruno Latour and 
Steve Woolgar, but others soon followed (Knorr-Cetina 1981; Lynch 1985; 
Traweek 1988). Like the new experimentalists, they stressed the innovative 
and revolutionary nature of their work and the goal of correcting the far-too-
theoretical views dominating philosophy of science:
What makes laboratory theories so atheoretical is the lack of any divorce from 
instrumental manipulation. Instead, they confront us as discursively crystallised ex-
perimental operations, and are in turn woven into the process of performing experi-
mentation. (Knorr-Cetina 1981: 4)
Indeed, what most of these scholars and movements share is a form of self-
description that stresses the novelty and innovativeness of their own approach: 
they advance the claim that experimentation, intervention, and instrumenta-
tion were not on the philosophical radar before they introduced it. The first 
section of this paper aims to evaluate this invention narrative and its relation 
to Ian Hacking. 
In the second section, we show how problematic this invention narrative 
is from a historical point of view. We therefore go on to explore a second 
hypothesis: that the rise of a philosophy of experiment in the 1980s was due 
less to the invention than to the rediscovery of the forgotten and neglected sub-
ject of experimentation. As we will highlight, this rediscovery narrative also 
emerges, though less explicitly, in the work of the practical-turn protagonists 
cited in the invention narrative accounts above. To illustrate, we will focus on 
the example of gaston Bachelard, exploring how his work on experimenta-
tion was taken up by more recent authors such as Hacking and Latour.
The example of Bachelard will also demonstrate, however, that the redis-
covery narrative too faces problems. We therefore will argue for a third possi-
bility, namely that it is better to abandon the idea that ‘experimentation’ has a 
fixed essence with the same significance for different periods of the history of 
the philosophy of science. We maintain that experimentation instead should 
be seen as an ambiguous, contextually informed resource that can be mobi-
lized for multiple purposes.
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Thus, we end by proposing a third account that eschews taking up experi-
mentation as a fixed research object that is either present or not and instead 
offers a contextualist narrative centered around two questions: in what way did 
experimentation become a philosophical problem for certain authors and for 
what purpose? From this perspective, we suggest that what makes Hacking’s 
claims especially innovative is how they reconceptualize a number of exist-
ing debates – such as those on realism vs. antirealism, the Science Wars, and 
incommensurability – by mobilizing experimentation as a resource. 
2. The invention narrative
As remarked in the introduction, the emphasis on the experimental aspects 
of science that characterized new experimentalism was in many cases accom-
panied by an historiographical claim about the novelty of experimentation as 
a philosophical subject. This invention narrative is widespread among philoso-
phers, historians, and sociologists of science. In this section, we will focus on 
two key versions of it, advanced by Ian Hacking and Peter galison respectively. 
2.1. Hacking’s back-to-bacon movement
In a paper which anticipates many of the claims of Representing and Inter-
vening, Hacking argues that
no field in the philosophy of science is more systematically neglected than experi-
ment. Our grad school teachers may have told us that scientific method is experimental 
method but histories of science have become histories of theory. Experiments, the phi-
losophers say, are of value only when they test theory. Experimental work, they imply, 
has no life of its own. (Hacking 1982: 71)
A few years later, in a review paper, he expands on this narrative. Accord-
ing to Hacking, before the 1980s “there was almost no reflective philosophy of 
experiment”, since philosophers and historians of science had “neglected the 
experimental side of science” (Hacking 1988a: 147). He adds that “what little 
had been published was not seen as writing about experiment – that was not 
something to write about – but as discussion of the theory/observation distinc-
tion, or the impossibility of eliminating a theory by crucial experiment, etc.” 
(Hacking 1988a: 147). In later publications and interviews, Hacking does not 
hesitate to ascribe himself the role of trailblazer with respect to philosophical 
studies of experimentation:
Learning from other people, I started the enthusiasm for experiment in the phi-
losophy of science. My friend Francis Everett and I used to go walking in the Stanford 
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hills [...] He’s the person who’s planning the only experimental test of the theory of 
gravity. It’s called gravity Probe II [...] He and I started talking about experiments. 
It happened that Representing and Intervening came out just a little bit before every-
body else’s books on experiments except for Bruno Latour’s Laboratory Life. (Hacking 
1992a: 5)2
Thus in Representing and Intervening, Hacking hoped “to initiate a Back-to-
Bacon movement, in which we attend more seriously to experimental science” 
(Hacking 1983: 150). But what he actually meant was something more than a 
simple return to Bacon’s philosophy: Hacking’s aim was to reaffirm the role of 
scientific experiments against the exclusive attention philosophers gave the na-
ture, structure, functions, and limits of scientific theories. What Hacking further 
argues is that new experimentalism should not only account for experiments in 
science but moreover should assign them a more primary role with respect to 
theory. The controversial claim Hacking puts forward in this respect is that “ex-
perimentation has a life of its own” (Hacking 1983: 150), largely independent of 
the theoretical frameworks in which it occurs. Thus, Hacking’s claim to novelty 
lies in his point that while earlier philosophers of course had already treated the 
topic of experiments, they always did so in relation to (or rather, in a manner de-
pendent on) theory. Theory-independent experimentation was never considered 
in philosophical discussions, according to Hacking, and it is precisely this type 
of experimentation that he aimed to move to the spotlight. His appeal reminds 
us that if we cannot conceive of experimental practices in themselves, qua prac-
tices, and not as the expression, extension, or confirmation of some theory, we 
continue to miss a fundamental trait of scientific inquiry. 
2.2. galison’s critical postmodern model 
Next to Hacking’s, the most influential instance of a new experimentalist 
invention narrative is the one put forward by Peter galison. galison’s How 
experiments end (1987) was quickly recognized as a paradigmatic study of the 
new experimentalism. Like Hacking, galison makes historical claims about 
when experimentation became a topic of concern for philosophers and histori-
ans. He begins the preface of the book with the following claim: “despite the 
slogan that science advances through experiments, virtually the entire litera-
ture of the history of science concerns theory” (galison 1987: ix).
galison elaborated on this history more fully a year later by comparing three 
philosophical models of the nature of scientific inquiry: the positivist, anti-pos-
 2  In other places, making reference to Ravetz (1971), he seems to grant that sociologists were the 
real initiators of the study of experimentation: “once people did begin to think about experiment, 
those conducting social studies of science got there first” (Hacking 1988: 148).
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itivist, and ‘critical postmodern’ (galison 1988). For galison, positivists begin 
with a dual-layered image of science, with a shifting lower layer of theories and 
a steadily growing higher layer of observations, which shapes these theories 
and their evolution. The anti-positivists later inverted that picture, instead con-
ceiving of observation as determined by theory and therefore arguing that, like 
theories, a set of observations could shift in light of a new theory.
galison disagrees with both models and links new experimentalism with a 
wholly pluralistic historiographic view – which he calls the critical postmod-
ern – characterized by a plurality of levels corresponding to globally cooperat-
ing but also partially autonomous layers. Not only does galison disagree with 
the assumption of the unity of science at work in both of the previous models, 
he also breaks down the dichotomy between theory and observation, substitut-
ing the latter for two new layers: experiments and instruments. Experimenta-
tion is thus explicitly discussed, by galison, in relation to the material culture 
of instruments and experimental materials.
3. The rediscovery narrative
In the previous section we outlined two examples of new experimentalist 
arguments claiming to offer something new in philosophy of science, namely 
the foregrounding of the role of experiments and instruments in science. Yet 
though it rarely has been questioned (for an exception, see Radder 2009), this 
claim can be problematized historically. Indeed, it is far from true that experi-
ments and instruments were never a proper object of philosophical concern 
before the 1970s. 
There are many examples of philosophical engagement with experimenta-
tion dating to the end of the 19th century or first decades of the 20th. One thinks 
of Ernst Mach or Ludwik Fleck in germany, Pierre duhem, Henri Bergson, 
or gaston Bachelard in France, and John dewey or P. W. Bridgman in the 
Anglo-American context. One example worth highlighting is Hugo dingler 
and his book Das Experiment: Sein Wesen und seine Geschichte, in which we 
find an early example of the invention narrative, predating the above examples 
by fifty years: “A real ‘philosophy of experiment’ has never been written to my 
knowledge. Therefore this book should at the same time be seen as a pioneer-
ing study in this area” (dingler 1928, i).
We will only briefly explore one such case, that of gaston Bachelard, be-
cause Bachelard’s philosophy of experiment was explicitly taken up by Hack-
ing and others (3.1). This example underscores the invention narrative as prob-
lematic and points toward a plausible alternative hypothesis, which we call the 
rediscovery narrative. However, as we will see, this alternative hypothesis also 
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faces problems, most notably in its inability to account for the varying ways in 
which Bachelard’s work has been interpreted by later philosophers or has been 
mobilized to support very different, even opposing, claims (3.2).
3.1. The eternal return of experiments: the case of gaston Bachelard
Bachelard’s philosophy of science included a “philosophy of experiment” 
(Bachelard 1927: 26), which he mainly conceptualized through the concept of 
phénoménotechnique, first introduced in the early 1930s. According to Bach-
elard, contemporary science was characterized by a shift away from purely de-
scriptive phenomenology toward “a phenomenotechnique through which new 
phenomena are not simply found but invented, constructed and built from all 
parts” (Bachelard 1931: 76). His philosophy thus defended a form of construc-
tivism, in the sense it maintained that “science does not correspond to a world 
to be described. It corresponds to a world to be constructed” (Bachelard 1951: 
46). One of the examples Bachelard provides in support of this claim is that of 
isotopes in mass spectroscopy:
The trajectories that allow the separation of isotopes in the mass spectroscope do not 
exist in nature; one must produce them technically. They are reified theorems. We shall 
have to show that that which man makes by a scientific technique […] does not exist in 
nature and neither does a natural range of natural phenomena. (Bachelard 1949: 103)
In Bachelard’s work, we thus find a clear philosophy of experiment. Al-
though authors such as Althusser, Foucault, and Bourdieu – who mainly mo-
bilized Bachelard’s idea of an epistemological rupture (i.e. of a radical break 
between scientific thinking and imagination; see Simons 2018) – largely ig-
nored this part of Bachelard’s philosophy, other prominent philosophers did 
take it up. This is the case, for instance, of georges Canguilhem (1955), gilbert 
Simondon (see Bontems 2010), and François dagognet (1965; 1979), who, in 
their respective analyses of different sciences drew from Bachelard’s notion 
of phenomenotechnique. Their attention to Bachelard’s work undermines the 
plausibility of a “rediscovery narrative”, since Bachelard’s philosophy of ex-
periment was never forgotten. 
However, it is also true that from the 1980s on there has been growing inter-
est in Bachelard’s phenomenotechnique, prevalently within Anglophone phi-
losophy of science (Tiles 1984, Castelao-Lawless 1995, Chimisso 2001, Simons 
2018). Hans Radder has even framed one of the central issues in the philosophy 
of experiment as the ‘Bachelardian challenge’: “it is the question how scien-
tific knowledge can be about a human-independent reality, if this reality is so 
thoroughly dependent on human work” (Radder 1993: 328). In a similar vein, 
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Hans-Jörg Rheinberger has picked up the notion of phenomenotechnique to 
articulate the experimental aspects of molecular biology (Rheinberger 2005).
In new experimentalism, we also find elements of this rediscovery of Bach-
elard’s phenomenotechnique. galison makes occasional references to Bach-
elard; he describes the latter as “a gently materialist opponent of a certain 
stripe of neo-Kantian idealism” (galison 1997: 18n24). Similarly, Ackermann 
uses Bachelard’s work to explore the idea that scientific observations are dis-
continuous with common sense (Ackermann 1985: 88).
There is no mention of Bachelard in Hacking’s Representing and Interven-
ing. To some extent this is to be expected: Hacking’s interest in shedding light 
on the power of experiments outside the limits of theory would find little of 
use in Bachelardian ideas of instruments or of theoretical entities as “reified 
theories”. However, in a text whose first appearance dates to 1983, Hacking 
acknowledges that his position is “strikingly similar” to the one advanced by 
Bachelard’s Le matérialisme rationnel (Bachelard 1953; see also Vagelli 2014: 
262). There, Hacking notes, Bachelard pointed out that the introduction of 
new phenomena, such as the photoelectric effect, represented an “absolute 
discontinuity” with the history of science. However, as Hacking further ar-
gues, Bachelard also believed in scientific progress and in the accumulation 
of experimental techniques (Hacking 2002: 45). This latter point aligns with 
Hacking’s idea that the phenomena produced in a scientific laboratory have 
the ability to persist regardless of changes in theory (Hacking 1983: 220-233). 
Scientific effects are relative in the sense that they are bound to our ability to 
recreate them; they depend on our technical skills but still cut across different 
theories and styles of reasoning. Phenomena that are stable, that is, that are 
capable of being regularly reproduced in a laboratory setting, are not objective 
in the absolute or foundationalist sense, because they still depend on our tech-
nical skills and on the invention of our experimental apparatuses, but they are 
objective in the sense that they can be largely independent of general theories. 
Thus, if we consider the example of Bachelard, a rediscovery narrative does 
seems a more accurate assessment of Hacking’s contribution to the philosophy 
of experiment than the invention narrative: experiments were forgotten, and 
new experimentalists put the topic back on the table. And indeed, we find this 
rediscovery narrative in several overviews of the philosophy of experiment. 
Friedrich Steinle for example, starts an article by discussing how Francis Ba-
con, John Stuart Mill, and even Pierre duhem vividly discussed the topic of 
experimentation before it fell off the philosophical radar:
Throughout the 20th century, however, philosophy of science narrowed its perspec-
tive on experiment significantly. […] Only in the 1980s, did philosophy of science 
 WERE ExPERIMENTS EVER NEgLECTEd 175
again take up the question of experiment. The ‘New Experimentalism’ in philoso-
phy of science arose, stimulated by Hacking’s emphasis on a ‘Baconian variety’ of ex-
periment, clearly emphasizing the insufficiency of the older accounts. (Steinle 2002: 
408-409; cf. Feest and Steinle 2014: 274)
Nevertheless, this rediscovery narrative also faces problems. The work of 
earlier authors is often not addressed or analyzed in a uniform manner, lead-
ing to very divergent interpretations of earlier thinkers. We will illustrate this 
weakness by contrasting Hacking’s interpretation of Bachelard with that of 
Bruno Latour. The comparison will show that it remains unclear exactly what 
is being rediscovered in the first place. 
3.2. divergent interpretations of Bachelard 
The problem with the rediscovery narrative is its assumption that there is a 
fixed object (the ‘experiment’) that can be rediscovered. We want to question 
this assumption, again using the example of Bachelard. Although numerous 
authors have taken up the Bachelardian notion of phenomenotechnique, they 
often interpret it in radically different ways. As we saw above, Hacking, for 
example, advanced a relatively realist interpretation of Bachelard’s philosophy 
(see Vagelli 2017). In the work of someone such as Bruno Latour, however, we 
find a quite different Bachelard.
Latour and Woolgar (1979) took inspiration from Bachelard’s notion of phe-
nomenotechnique to support the claim that facts are artificial in the sense that 
they are manufactured (as opposed to phony). As has been well-noted, Latour 
and Woolgar made this point using the example of the laboratory synthesis of 
TRF (Thyrotropin Releasing Factor), a paradigmatic case of the social con-
struction of a scientific fact.
We may think TRF has been there all along, just waiting to be discovered, 
but Latour and Woolgar argue that it is only after 1969 and a particular se-
ries of laboratory events, exchanges, and negotiations that it became a fact. 
At this historical juncture, scientists decided to turn a statement about the 
chemical structure of TRF into an object, which then came to be seen as the 
cause of the statement. Yet since scientific knowledge is sustained by the net-
work of creators and distributors of that knowledge, a change in the context 
of laboratory norms might turn TRF back into an artefact (or a sentence). 
It is in this context that Latour and Woolgar take up Bachelard’s notion of 
phenomenotechnique:
It is not simply that phenomena depend on certain material instrumentation; rath-
er, the phenomena are thoroughly constituted by the material setting of the laboratory. 
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The artificial reality, which participants describe in terms of an objective entity, has in 
fact been constructed by the use of inscription devices. Such a reality, which Bachelard 
(1953) terms the ‘phenomenotechnique,’ takes on the appearance of a phenomenon by 
virtue of its construction through material techniques. (Latour and Woolgar 1979: 64)
The contrast between this seemingly constructivist stance and Hacking’s 
realist position is striking, and it is confirmed further if we analyze the dis-
tinction Hacking draws between scientific facts that are historically contin-
gent and those that are historically constituted. Hacking’s realism is built on 
the belief that phenomena are created – that is, they are “brought into being 
at moments of time” – but that they cannot be said to be historically consti-
tuted, because they existed before becoming objects of scientific inquiry and 
“are phenomena thereafter, regardless of what happens” (Hacking 2002: 44). 
This idea too is supported by some of Bachelard’s texts, for instance when 
Bachelard writes:
The electron existed before the 20th century men and women. But before them, the 
electron did not sing. In the triode valve, however, the electron sings. This phenom-
enological realization occurred at a precise point when mathematical and technical 
development was coming to maturity. (Bachelard 1938: 246)
With both Hacking and Latour and Woolgar supporting their claims by 
drawing from Bachelard’s work, we end up with two competing interpreta-
tions of phenomenotechnique. One way out of this conflict would be to inves-
tigate which interpretation of Bachelard is correct and then subsequently to 
assess whether Hacking’s philosophy of experiment was a faithful rediscovery 
of Bachelard’s earlier work or a (perhaps fruitful) misinterpretation of it. We 
would like to draw a different lesson from this debate, however: namely, that it 
is worth questioning the assumption that there is a fixed philosophical notion 
called ‘experiment’ to be rediscovered through the work of Bachelard.
4. The contextualist narrative
One possible rebuttal of the previous arguments is to say that, though there 
have been earlier philosophers of experiment who were never forgotten, the 
value of Hacking’s new experimentalism resides in the rediscovery of this tra-
dition in the Anglo-American context. Although this counterclaim is partly 
true, it at best concludes that new experimentalism was nothing novel in the 
history of the philosophy of experiment but rather a mere product of the ‘glo-
balized parochialism’ of Anglophone philosophy and its impulse to ignore 
other traditions (Wolters 2015).
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Another possible counterargument would be to say that a philosophy of ex-
periment was present in Bachelard’s work in only an embryonic state – and that 
only in the 1980s was a proper philosophy of experiment developed. Such an 
assessment finds grounds in Latour’s claim that, although a step in the right 
direction, Bachelard’s “interest in demonstrating the ‘mediations’ in scientific 
work was never extended” (Latour and Woolgar 1979: 258). However, this line 
of argument risks anachronism, as it assesses Bachelard’s philosophical project 
according to the standards of a “good” philosophy of experiment as they devel-
oped from the 1980s on. Moreover, this essentialist view of what a philosophy 
of experiment should look like also does injustice to Hacking’s originality. The 
value of Hacking’s philosophy of experiment dwells in something other than 
filling in the details of Bachelard’s earlier work. Indeed, we argue that it resides 
above all in the innovative ways Hacking mobilizes the topic of experimenta-
tion to introduce new philosophical options into well-entrenched debates. We 
therefore propose a contextualist narrative of the history of the philosophy of 
experiment, which we think is able to solve the problems posed by the earlier 
narratives while simultaneously acknowledging Hacking’s unique contribution.
4.1. Resituating Hacking’s work on experiments
Several scholars have noted that Hacking’s famous slogan that “experimen-
tation has a life of its own” can mean various things (Mayo 1996: 62; Soler et al. 
2014: 7-8). Typically, it is associated with a critique of the theory-centeredness 
of philosophy of science: the purpose of experimentation often diverges from 
the mere testing of a general theory, often instead consisting in the aim of 
better articulating phenomena or of simply making certain that instruments 
work. We do not intend to contest this claim about the criticism of theory-
centeredness, but by advancing a contextualist narrative we mean stress that 
this interpretation of Hacking leaves open the question of why these aspects 
of experimentation are philosophically relevant. It is here that context matters, 
since new experimentalists find it important to invoke these other non-theo-
ry-oriented dimensions of experimentation in response to specific problems 
found in the philosophy, history, and sociology of science.
In the framework of the sociology of scientific knowledge, authors such as 
david Bloor and Barry Barnes, and later Collins, Pickering, and Shapin, argued 
that scientific controversies are never determined by purely logical or rational 
means, but rather that social factors play a decisive role. In their Leviathan 
and the Air-Pump, for instance, Shapin and Schaffer argue that the production 
of accepted matters of fact “rested upon the acceptance of certain social and 
discursive conventions, and that it depended upon the production and protec-
tion of a special form of social organization” (Shapin and Schaffer 1985: 22). In 
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relation to experimentation, this idea was expressed most famously by Collins 
in his notion of ‘experimenters’ regress’:
The problem is that, since experimentation is a matter of skillful practice, it can 
never be clear whether a second experiment has been done sufficiently well to count 
as check on the results of a first. Some further test is needed to test the quality of the 
experiment – and so forth. (Collins 1985: 2)
According to Collins, whether or not an experiment is accepted as cor-
rect is, in the end, based on social consensus rather than rational argument. 
To make such claims, these sociologists relied on philosophical arguments 
about underdetermination or the empirical equivalence of different theories, 
taking inspiration from scholars such as W.V.O. Quine and Nelson good-
man (see Zammito 2004). It is in this sense that theory-ladenness becomes 
a problem: if the correctness of a theory can never be determined based on 
strict deductive or empirical arguments, the door remains open for sociologi-
cal explanations.
It is in the context of this discussion that we can identify the value of new 
experimentalism as “having provided us sticks with which to beat the social 
constructivists” (Mayo 1996: 61). In response to the sociologists, the new ex-
perimentalists aimed to restore the constraining role of empirical evidence but 
in a novel way, moving away from traditional philosophers of science who ac-
cepted a theory-centered model of science toward the rabbit hole of underde-
termination. This is indeed the type of self-positioning and framing one finds 
in the prefaces of Ackermann (1985), Franklin (1986), and galison (1987). The 
strategy of these authors was to stress that there are no given, absolute logical 
and empirical constraints but that they can be introduced – and this is precisely 
what intervening in science is all about.
galison, for instance, states that “there is no strictly logical termination 
point inherent in the experimental process” nor is there “a universal formula 
for discovery, or an after-the-fact reconstruction based on an inductive logic” 
(galison 1987: 3). Nonetheless, his conclusion is not that social factors there-
fore determine outcomes but rather that we should look at how experimental 
work introduces new constraints: “As features of the instruments, theories, and 
procedures are better understood, the number of constraints on interpretation 
increases” (galison 1987: 132).
Hacking follows the same path to a certain extent, stressing – especially in 
the works after Representing and Intervening – how experimentation introduces 
new constraints on how phenomena can be interpreted. drawing insights from 
multiple sources, including galison’s idea that not only experiments but also 
“instruments have a life of their own” and Pickering’s extension of duhem’s 
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thesis about auxiliary hypotheses, Hacking highlights the interplay between 
several levels of “plastic resources”, including “theory, phenomenology of the 
apparatus, and the material instrumentation and objects being investigated” 
(1991: 237). The mutual adjustments among these levels results in both the 
stability (Hacking 1988b) and the “self-vindicating feature” of laboratory sci-
ences (Hacking 1992b). When we look at Hacking’s work in further detail, 
more specific debates come to the foreground – the realism-antirealism debate 
(4.2.1), the Science Wars (4.2.2), the debate on incommensurability (4.2.3) – but 
these nonetheless fit into the same program.
4.1.1 Experimentation as a new form of realism
Another important piece of context for Hacking’s work is the realism-
antirealism debate of the 1970s and 1980s, which centered around questions 
concerning the nature and function of scientific theories and theoretical en-
tities: are theories objective descriptions of an independent reality or mere 
instrumental tools to make predictions? do theoretical entities such as atoms 
really exist or are they just useful fictions? Whereas scientific realists be-
lieved that entities, states, and processes described by true theories referred 
to genuine entities in the world (Putnam 1971), scientific anti-realists denied 
this (van Fraassen 1980). For the anti-realists, scientific theories were instead 
instruments that at best could be useful or apt but not ‘true’ in the ordinary 
sense (van Fraassen 1980: 88).
developed against the backdrop of this debate, Hacking’s Representing 
and Intervening can be read as a reply to van Fraassen’s constructive empiri-
cism and to the corresponding claim that “science aims to give us theories 
which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves a belief 
only that it is empirically adequate” (van Fraassen 1980: 12). Here Hacking 
introduces an idea that is typically linked to discussions of his philosophy of 
experiment: experimental realism. Whereas van Fraassen’s anti-realist stance 
encompasses both theories and theoretical entities, Hacking argues, on the 
contrary, that in many cases we can have compelling evidence supporting 
our belief in the existence of electrons without necessarily having a plausible 
theoretical description of them. This evidence is provided by our ability to 
manipulate theoretical, postulated entities and use them to intervene in caus-
al nexuses in the world. “We shall count as real what we can use to intervene 
in the world to affect something else, or what the world can use to affect us” 
(Hacking 1983: 146).
Hacking is thus anti-realist about theories but realist about theoretical 
entities. He grounds this distinction in the claim that “[i]f you can spray 
electrons, then they are real” (Hacking 1983: 23). In other words, more than 
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the theory describing the electron, it is the scientist’s ability to “shoot them” 
with a polarizing electron gun (in an experiment measuring the charge of the 
quark) that provides the best evidence of their actual existence. His point is 
that “by the time we can use the electron to manipulate other parts of nature 
in a systematic way, the electron has ceased to be something hypothetical, 
something inferred” (Hacking 1983: 262). He thus mobilizes philosophy of 
experiment to shift the existing realism-antirealism debate, by introducing 
a new kind of realism whose defining traits are the active, pragmatic, and 
heuristic functions of experimentation. 
4.1.2 The science wars
The realism vs. antirealism debate eventually gave birth to a subsequent 
debate in the 1990s known as the Science Wars, which opposed scientists and 
constructivists (Ross 1996; gieryn 1999). One of the main points of divergence 
or “sticking points” dividing the two sides was whether scientific classifications 
are “natural”, that is, found in nature or humanly created (Hacking 1999).
In this context, Hacking was able to draw on the distinction he had previ-
ously developed between natural kinds and interactive kinds (Hacking 1995). 
According to Hacking, the objects of the natural sciences are natural kinds and 
indifferent to our categorization, whereas human or social kinds are shaped 
by the interaction between a given scientific category and a subject thus cat-
egorized. This divide partially maps onto the Hacking distinction we already 
encountered in 3.2, between facts that are historically contingent and those 
that are historically constituted. Hacking uses the examples of the laser and the 
maser (Hacking 1983: 226-227; 1999: 179-180), phenomena that might not have 
occurred in the universe before we created them. In that sense Hacking identi-
fies them as historically contingent. Yet this does not mean they are unreal or 
not objective. In fact, far from being historically or humanly constituted, lasers 
and masers for Hacking are natural kinds. 
On the other hand, within a constructivist framework, the historical and 
technical context of the production of a given phenomenon represents its 
own condition of existence. A constructivist like Latour would argue that all 
theoretical entities are historically contingent and constituted, both those be-
longing to the natural sciences and those of the social sciences. For Hacking, 
here constructivists are overplaying their cards so to speak. They go too far 
in their claims about natural kinds, though he concedes that they do have a 
point concerning the constructed aspect of classifications such as autism or 
homosexuality. The claim about entities being historically constituted is thus 
not completely wrong, but Hacking argues that this is only correct for the so-
cial sciences, whose theoretical objects, being both historically contingent and 
 WERE ExPERIMENTS EVER NEgLECTEd 181
historically constituted, did not exist in any specifiable form until they become 
objects of scientific inquiry (Hacking 2002: 11).
Thus once again, Hacking mobilizes elements of his philosophy of experi-
ment to dismantle existing debates and move them in new directions.
4.1.3 Experimentation as new form of continuism
A final debate that Hacking tried to shake up was the one over the incom-
mensurability of science initiated by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend in the 
1970s (Kuhn 1962; 1967; Feyerabend 1975). This is true not only of Hacking 
but also of galison. Indeed, it is possible to see the emergence of the philoso-
phy of experiment in the 1980s as a direct response to the thesis of scientific 
incommensurability. 
In 3.2 we mentioned that, for Hacking, stable laboratory phenomena are re-
sistant to changes in theory and can cross through and accumulate through 
different theoretical frameworks. Seen in this light, experimental techniques 
and results are the best ways to assess scientific progress. Hacking locates new 
forms of continuity in the production of phenomena and experimental styles. 
Phenomena and instruments have a “life of their own”, as they have the tenden-
cy to accumulate through theoretical changes. Hacking links this insight to his 
interest in the different styles of scientific reasoning, ranging from mathemati-
cal postulation to statistics, which according to Hacking are also accumulative:
What we accumulate are experimental techniques and styles of reasoning. Anglo-
phone philosophy of science has too much debated the question of whether theoretical 
knowledge accumulates. Maybe it does not. So what? Phenomena and reasons accu-
mulate. (Hacking 2002: 45)
This passage presents the same theme that is also present in galison’s crit-
ical postmodern model described in 2.2: a complex and patchy vision sug-
gesting that there is “no single way in which the patterns of continuity and 
discontinuity are aligned and there is no reductive hierarchy” (galison 1988: 
209). The galison model aims to recuperate the best of both the positivist 
and antipositivist models, while incorporating new insights drawn from new 
experimentalism:
By breaking up the experimental level into intercalated patches of continuity and 
discontinuity we incorporate the insight of the antipositivists: experiment and experi-
ence do not give unmediated access to universal, basic propositions. At the same time, 
by allowing experiment to continue across theoretical breaks, we (partially) resurrects 
the positivists’ contention that theories do change while leaving unbroken a chain – or 
at least a surviving. (galison 1988: 209)
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Thus according to galison, there can be independent continuity in ex-
perimental knowledge despite clear theoretical breaks: “periods during which 
theorists break with tradition do not necessarily correspond to disruptions 
in the subject matter, methods, procedures, and instruments of experimental 
physics” (galison 1987: 13). Countering the incommensurability thesis, gali-
son points out that “experimental conclusions have a stubbornness not easily 
cancelled by theory change” (galison 1987: 259).
Yet, Hacking’s and galison’s positions do not entirely overlap. According 
to Hacking, for instance, it is not only phenomena that accumulate through 
theoretical shifts but also statements of observation. Hacking repeats the neo-
positivists’ belief that observational statements are made in a pre-theoretical 
language which makes translation between the two different theories possible 
(Hacking 1983: 167-185). Furthermore, he sees both neo- and anti- or post-pos-
itivists philosophers and historians of science as sitting on the same side of the 
divide between theory and experimentation: their approach remain theoretical 
and incapable of accounting for the relative autonomy of experiments. This an-
cillary role assigned to experimentation with respect to theory in the so-called 
“standard image” of science was not subverted by anti-positivists such as Karl 
Popper who, as Hacking remarks, believed the experimenter should not begin 
work until the theoretician has finished their job (Hacking 2008: 109). 
despite these differences, Hacking and galison seem to agree on the fact 
that elements of a philosophy of experiment has the potential to steer the old 
debate over incommensurability into new directions.
5. Conclusion
Our reconstruction has shown that experimentation did not appear out 
of the blue in philosophy of science in the 1980s. A variety of traditions re-
flecting on the role of experiments in science existed before and were still 
operational at that time. We have also demonstrated that when these earlier 
traditions are mentioned by more recent scholars, they are often not simply 
‘rediscovered’. The contextualist narrative we put forward (§4) highlights how 
specific versions of both the invention (§2) and the rediscovery (§3) narratives 
that philosophers of experiment articulate usually reveal their goals vis-à-vis 
larger debates: there are always specific reasons why philosophers of experi-
ment claim to either have invented the philosophical topic of experimentation 
or rediscovered older philosophies of experiment.
As a consequence, we maintain that experimentation should not be con-
sidered a fixed notion that is either present or not in various philosophical, 
historical, and sociological discourses. Rather, in its myriad appearances the 
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topic can be grouped in (at least) two important ways: (a) by what is meant by 
experimentation and (b) by what the philosopher in question wishes to achieve 
by invoking experimentation. Only a contextualist narrative can resolve the 
problems we encountered with both the invention and the rediscovery narra-
tives while simultaneously acknowledging the specificity of Hacking’s answers 
to both (a) and (b).
Of course, if one wishes to assess Hacking’s contribution to the history of 
the philosophy of experiment fully, a great number of other questions remain. 
Once one accepts that experimentation can shift in meaning and use, new 
avenues for a genuine history of the philosophy of experiment are opened up. 
We therefore would like to end this article by briefly highlighting three differ-
ent avenues for future research in the history of the philosophy of experiment.
First of all, we must take into account shifts that have occurred in philoso-
phy itself, not only in terms of its professionalization but also in terms of the 
specific topics and issues it deems central or relevant. From this perspective, 
when assessing recent or earlier philosophies of experiment, it is key to un-
derstand how experiments emerged for these authors as a site of philosophical 
preoccupation. For instance, to assess Hacking’s innovative contribution to 
the philosophy of experiment, we first must identify and evaluate what moti-
vated his reflections on experimentation. This is the approach we have tried 
to employ in this paper, which we think could be extended to other recent 
philosophers of experiment.
Secondly, we must examine the ‘regional’ meaning of experimentation in dif-
ferent domains of knowledge as well as developments within these sciences them-
selves – not only in terms of how specific scientific disciplines have developed 
throughout the 20th century but also in terms of which science is considered 
paradigmatic at specific moments in time. From this perspective, it is to be 
expected that reflecting on the form of mathematical physics dominant in the 
period immediately following Einstein’s theories, as in Bachelard’s case, would 
require a very different approach than working on the high-energy physics and 
biochemistry prevalent in the second half of the 20th century that Hacking and 
Latour respectively studied.
Finally, to fully grasp Hacking’s philosophy of experiment also requires ex-
amining how the role of experimentation itself has shifted in science and society. 
From this perspective, one might wonder, for instance, whether the new philo-
sophical interest in experimentation in the 1980s was in part a product of shifts 
in the institutional structure of science – part of developments that put instru-
ments and intervention in the spotlight, such as Big Science (Pestre 1997) and 
the commodification of science (Lyotard 1979) – in ways that would not have 
applied for Bachelard or dingler.
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All of these questions deserve detailed analysis. While in this paper we have 
limited ourselves to the first, philosophical question, our hope is that future 
research will help elaborate a history of the philosophy of experiment that ad-
dresses all three – and gives authors such Hacking the places in that history 
that they rightfully deserve.
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